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PATTERNS AND DRIVERS OF CO-PRODUCTION IN 
NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH IN ENGLAND AND WALES: FROM 
NEO-LIBERALISM TO NEW LOCALISM
Ian Brunton-Smith and Karen Bullock*
Established in England and Wales in the context of the neo-liberal governments of the 1980s and 
promoted through the New Local agenda of New Labour and beyond, Neighbourhood Watch (NW) 
is a primary means through which the state and citizens may co-produce crime control. However, 
whether citizens have the time or inclination to co-produce is debated, and it is generally believed 
that NW proliferates in advantaged, low crime rate areas that need it least. Drawing on analysis 
of the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) (1988–2010/11), this article examines long-
term trends in participation in NW. It examines the spread of NW, how household support for 
NW fluctuates once established and the changing importance of some of the key household drivers 
of participation in NW. It then assesses the extent to which NW schemes are concentrated in more 
affluent areas, showing that this is moderated by crime risk.
Keywords: Neighbourhood Watch, crime prevention, co-production, Crime Survey of 
England and Wales (CSEW)
Introduction
The ‘co-production’ of public services
‘Co-production’ is a cornerstone of public policy reform in England and Wales as it 
is across the globe (Osborne et al. 2016: 639). This provides a model for the agents of 
the state and citizens to come together to contribute to the design and/or delivery of a 
public service or public good (Mattson 1986; Ostrom 1996; Pestoff 2006; Bovaird 2007; 
Parrado et al. 2013; Brandsen and Honingh 2015; Voorberg et al. 2015; Alford and Yates 
2016; Van Eijk and Steen 2016; Van Eijk et al. 2017). Co-production may take multiple 
forms involving a wide range of actors and activities (Brandsen and Honingh 2015; 
Alford and Yates 2016; Loeffler and Bovaird 2016; Van Eijk and Steen 2016). But how-
ever it is configured, it represents a ‘process through which inputs from individuals who 
are not “in” the same organization are transformed into goods and services’ (Ostrom 
1996: 1037). As such, it implies an interaction between public agents and citizens that 
goes beyond consultation or listening to citizens or responding to citizens’ concerns 
towards some kind of active, collective production of tangible outputs or outcomes 
(Mattson 1986; Ostrom 1996; Alford and Yates 2016). Active voluntary citizen involve-
ment appears to be the critical dimension of all co-production research (Mattson 1986: 
52).
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The concept of co-production, central to many areas of contemporary public admin-
istration, purports to offer a cost-effective way to both increase efficiency and enhance 
the effectiveness of public services (Mattson 1986; Ostrom 1996; Pestoff 2009; Voorberg 
et  al. 2015; Osborne et  al. 2016; Van Eijk et  al. 2017). It gained traction during the 
New Public Management reforms of the 1980s (Pestoff 2009; Osborne et al. 2016) and 
continued to be highlighted as a means of solving the major demographical, polit-
ical and economic challenges facing Western democratic governments in the 21st cen-
tury (Pestoff 2009). It has also been identified as essential for sustaining provision in 
European welfare systems in the face of budget constraints (Pestoff 2006). However, 
since co-production differs from the ‘traditional model’ of public service—where pub-
lic officials are exclusively charged with responsibility for designing and providing ser-
vices to citizens (Pestoff 2006)—it has also been seen to offer a means of democratizing 
public services through promoting citizen empowerment and participation (Ostrom 
1996; Pestoff 2009) (see also Lowndes and Pratchett 2011; Stoker 2006).
Citizens, crime control and Neighbourhood Watch
Citizens have long played a role in the enactment of crime control and the ways that 
they have done so are diverse. In days gone by, communities were expected to join the 
‘hue and cry’, and householders were expected take turns volunteering as watchmen 
and presenting offenders at court (Rawlings 2002). Today, citizens in England and Wales 
may volunteer as special constables, may form street patrols and may, through collabo-
rating with the police to identify and resolve crime problems, contribute to community 
policing (Skogan 2008; Tilley 2008; Bullock 2014). Yet while there clearly is a long his-
tory of citizen involvement in crime control and the roles played are wide ranging, con-
temporary calls for citizens in England and Wales to co-produce can be situated within 
the neo-liberal Conservative administrations of the 1980s and 1990s, which stressed the 
desirability of rolling back the state, improving the efficiency of public services and pro-
moting volunteering and community/citizen action (Crawford 1999; Bullock 2014).
It was into this political and economic context that Neighbourhood Watch (NW) 
became established in England and Wales. NW brings neighbours together to act as 
the ‘eyes and ears’ of the police through watching out for suspicious behaviours in their 
neighbourhoods and reporting them, and to protect their properties and those of their 
neighbours (Rosenbaum 1987; 1988; Bennett 1990; Laycock and Tilley 1995; Gresham 
et al. 2004; Bullock 2014). NW appealed at once to the politically Conservative govern-
ments of the 1980s, concerned about maintaining standards of behaviour, and to liber-
tarian instincts regarding the importance of voluntarism, the role of the ‘active citizen’ 
and the minimal role of the state (Hope 1995: 43). The NW movement grew very quickly 
in this climate (Rosenbaum 1987; 1988; Skogan 1988; 1989; Bennett 1990; Hope 1995; 
Bullock 2014) and was to become one of the largest voluntary organizations in England 
and Wales and one of the largest single organized crime prevention activities in the 
world (Bennett et al. 2008). Co-production has been promoted as a way of increasing 
the effectiveness of public services (Mattson 1986; Ostrom 1996; Pestoff 2009; Voorberg 
et al. 2015; Osborne et al. 2016; Van Eijk et al. 2017), and reflecting these wider trends, 
citizen involvement in policing was promoted as cost-effective response to the problem 
of crime (Skogan 2008; Tilley 2008; Bullock 2014). Equally, citizen involvement in the 
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governance and delivery of crime control from the 1970s onwards was perceived to be 
an effective response to various crises. Community policing styles were endorsed in the 
context of contested relationships between the police and communities—characterized 
by a disconnection between agents of the public police and citizens—and by troubled 
relationships between the police and minority ethnic communities (Scarman 1981; 
Skogan 2008; Tilley 2008; Bullock 2014). And NW itself was ‘promoted as evidence of a 
break with a past which had been marked by fractured relations with the community, a 
remote police service and styles of policing which had contributed to major confronta-
tions with the public, including street disorders’ (McConville and Shepherd 1992: 1).
The promotion of the citizen as a co-producer of public services continued unabated 
into the 1990s and beyond. New Labour, through their ‘New Localism’ agenda, sought 
to embed the citizen ever more firmly within the oversight and delivery of public 
services and to redistribute power from central bureaucrats to local structures and, 
through the processes of double devolution, to citizens themselves (Lowndes and 
Pratchett 2011; Stoker 2006). Central to this narrative were ‘active citizens’ (Lowndes 
and Pratchett 2011; Stoker 2006). Devolving power to ‘active citizens’ would improve 
effectiveness and generate new democratic accountabilities and scrutiny (Home Office 
2004; see also Bullock 2014). In respect to policing governance this was usually linked 
to Neighbourhood Policing, a form of community policing, which aimed to engender 
greater democratic accountability through facilitating citizens involvement in deter-
mining how their communities are policed and ensuring that police listen and act on 
community concerns (Home Office 2004; Quinton and Morris 2008; Bullock 2014). 
Themes of devolving power to the responsible and ‘active citizen’ and imploring them 
to come together with state agents to address crime problems and to engender broader 
cultures of responsibility and mutuality have continued in the post-New Labour era 
into the Conservative-Liberal Coalition (2010–15) and the Conservative administration 
which followed it (2015+) (see e.g. Cabinet Office 2010). In respect to crime control, 
community policing continued to play a central role in the pursuit of direct citizen 
oversight of policing. And democratic accountability took a new twist with the intro-
duction of elected officials (police and crime commissioners) who serve to orient police 
services around the needs of citizens and communities and offer the prospect of indir-
ectly holding the service to account (see e.g. Bullock 2014; Lister and Rowe 2015).
Aims and contribution
While there has been much theoretical interest in the value of co-production, empirical 
studies of the key drivers of co-production are comparatively rare, with a general reli-
ance on small-scale case studies (Parrado et al. 2013; Van Eijk and Steen 2016; Brandsen 
and Honingh 2015). And despite its world-wide influence and position as a primary way 
through which the state and citizens may co-produce crime control, important ques-
tions remain about the drivers of participation in NW and the ways that participation is 
distributed on the basis of household and neighbourhood factors. Existing studies have 
indicated that it is difficult to both establish and sustain NW activities (Mukherjee and 
Wilson 1987; Rosenbaum 1988; Laycock and Tilley 1995) and have painted a mixed pic-
ture of the drivers of participation. But it has become conventionally understood that 
NW is more easily implemented in low crime rate, relatively affluent areas where citizens 
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own their own homes (McConville and Shepherd 1992; Laycock and Tilley 1995; Hope 
2000). NW then, may actually be regressive in nature, further concentrating crime con-
trol in the hands of those that need it least. This raises important questions about the 
distribution of security, the use of state resources and social justice (Rosenbaum 1987; 
Skogan 1988; Laycock and Tilley 1995; Hope 2000; Bullock 2014). Similarly, the ‘club 
goods’ associated with NW—the security marking, the watchful neighbours—may pro-
vide powerful assurances about potential risks, addressing particularly the needs of risk-
averse property-owners (Hope 2000: 160).
A number of empirical studies documented the proliferation of NW in the early 
1980s (e.g. Husain 1988; Bennett 1989; Laycock and Tilley 1995; Yarwood and Edwards 
1995), but few studies of NW have been conducted since the 1990s (Bennett et  al. 
2008). However, understanding the nature of the relationship between citizens and 
the structures of the state is arguably of greater importance than ever before. Since the 
establishment of the first English NW scheme in the 1980s, the relationship between 
public policing and citizens has been transformed. And the recent promotion of citizen 
involvement goes hand in hand with the political focus of successive British govern-
ments on ‘austerity’ following the global economic crisis of 2008, which has led to sig-
nificant cuts to police funding (HM Treasury 2010; HMIC 2017) and the retrenchment 
of the public police, reducing the visibility of uniformed officers in local communities 
(HMIC 2017). But the efficacy of such approaches to crime control obviously relies on 
the nature of citizens’ relationship with the state, or at least with the police, and their 
ability and willingness to organize themselves at the local level.
We use data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) to examine 
patterns of participation in NW in England and Wales since its inception in the neo-
liberal governments of the early 1980s through to the end of the New Labour Era in 
2010.1 Combining CSEW data with information from the census, we then use multi-
level models to explore the extent that household drivers of participation in NW have 
changed since its introduction, and the role that area crime and disadvantage may 
play. In so doing, we consider the vexed issue of whether NW takes root in areas where 
it is least needed, i.e., in low crime and affluent areas. We find falling rates of partici-
pation since the early 1990s, with one-in-ten households in England and Wales part of 
NW by 2010–11. Participation is less likely in disadvantaged areas, but more likely in 
high-crime areas. We also find that crime rates moderate the effect of disadvantage on 
participation in NW. Disadvantaged areas with a higher level of crime are more likely 
to operate an NW scheme than similar areas with a low level of crime, but both are less 
likely to have a scheme in operation than areas with a low level of disadvantage. Thus, 
our findings challenge any assumptions about there being a straightforward linear rela-
tionship between crime rates and NW or disadvantage and NW. Instead, we conclude 
that citizens will participate in NW where the ‘conditions are right’.
Literature review
Though arrangements may vary in practice, the term co-production suggests that out-
comes relevant to the provision of public services are being produced by the activity of 
public service agents together with the voluntary activities of citizens or groups of citizens 
1Additional analyses (available on request) suggest a generally stable picture since 2010–11.
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(Mattson 1986; Pestoff 2006; Parrado et al. 2013; Alford and Yates 2016). In respect of 
NW, co-production primarily involves agents of the public police coming together with 
citizens or groups of citizens. The public police provide practical support to shore up 
the operation of NW (usually their time or in-kind support) and provide symbolic sup-
port as citizen groups seem to demand the legitimacy that police sponsorship confers 
(Gresham et al. 2004; Bullock 2014). The formal organization of citizens is not neces-
sary for co-production, but organizations may facilitate co-ordination between citizens 
and public agencies and so enhance the levels of co-production (Pestoff 2006). Indeed, 
NW is supported by national infrastructure (see e.g. Gresham et al. 2004). However, co-
productive relationships and activities are various and complex, and their contribution 
may be more or less allied to the core task of a public service (Brandsen and Honingh 
2015). NW incorporates diverse activities more or less clearly linked to the core police 
task (Laycock and Tilley 1995; Gresham et al. 2004). Co-productive relationships and 
activities also generally create a mixture of public and private value (Alford and Yates 
2016). Similarly, an aim of NW is to protect individual private properties and people 
(e.g. through provision of property marking or personal alarms) while reducing overall 
public risk (e.g. through reducing the opportunities for crime within a neighbourhood) 
(Rosenbaum 1987; 1988; Laycock and Tilley 1995).
The reasons why citizens co-produce are varied (Alford 2009; Pestoff 2012; Verschuere 
et al. 2012; Alford and Yates 2016). While it is often held that citizens co-produce to receive 
something tangible or meaningful in return, citizens actually co-produce for a variety of 
extrinsic and intrinsic reasons (Alford 2009; Verschuere et al. 2012). Citizens will not, how-
ever, spontaneously co-produce simply because benefits could be achieved (Ostrom 1996: 
1082). If co-producing is straightforward (Alford 2009; Pestoff 2012; Verschuere et al. 2012; 
Van Eijk and Steen 2016), or where an issue is salient or meaningful (Loeffler and Bovaird 
2016; Van Eijk and Steen 2016), citizens are more likely to act. There also needs to be atten-
tion to organizational issues such as training public officials and establishing appropri-
ate institutional arrangements (e.g. management, oversight and processes) (Ostrom 1996; 
Alford 2009; Pestoff 2012; Verschuere et al. 2012; Loeffler and Bovaird 2016; Voorberg 
et al. 2015). Understanding citizen’s needs and motivations is essential, as is the provi-
sion of information and incentives, and the clarification of expectations and outcomes 
(Ostrom 1996; Alford 2009). Neighbourhood-level factors also play a role, with the higher 
levels of social capital, denser networks and the presence of voluntary opportunities all 
increasing co-production (Voorberg et al. 2015; Van Eijk and Steen 2016; see also Putnam 
2000). The presence of self-efficacy—a belief that one can make a meaningful differ-
ence—is also often identified as a stimulator of co-production (Parrado et al. 2013; Alford 
and Yates 2016; Loeffler and Bovaird 2016), as are high levels of trust and satisfaction with 
government (Loeffler and Bovaird 2016; Van Eijk and Steen 2016).
Studies of the drivers of participation in NW reveal mixed results. While some stud-
ies demonstrate that crime and disorder may motivate citizens to participate (Lavrakas 
and Herz 1982; Skogan 1989; Pattavina et al. 2006), others find the opposite. High rates 
of crime may deter participation in NW for a number of reasons. They may generate 
feelings of powerlessness, increase social isolation and undermine any belief that resi-
dents have that they are able to collectively control crime (Skogan 1988). Or high-crime 
rates may generate suspicion among residents, weakening the trust needed to motiv-
ate them to work together to implement crime prevention interventions (Henig 1984; 
Hourihan 1987; Rosenbaum 1987; Skogan 1988; Hope 1995; Laycock and Tilley 1995). 
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Especially where members are asked to exchange information about themselves, keep 
surveillance of and/or report on strangers (or neighbours) (Henig 1984; Hope 1995). 
The relationship between crime and participation in NW may not be linear (Husain 
1988; Skogan 1989). For example, Skogan (1989) outlines a situation where residents in 
both high and low crime rate areas may be deterred from participating—in the former, 
the intervention may seem too mild to deal with the problem and with the latter there 
is no need—but in areas of average crime rates motivation may be high.
Existing research tends to identify a negative relationship between neighbourhood dis-
advantage and membership of NW (Shernock 1986; Hope 1988; Husain 1988; Yarwood 
and Edwards 1995). This is believed to reflect both reduced opportunities for participation 
in more disadvantaged communities and that residents of poorer areas are less likely to 
be involved even when the opportunity is available (Hope 1995). However, Skogan (1989) 
argues that while there may be an effect of disadvantage when it comes to the opportunity 
to participate—there are more opportunities in better-off areas—this effect is diminished 
because people from better-off areas have fewer reasons to participate. By this reasoning, 
neighbourhood disadvantage must be considered in conjunction with the objective need 
for NW in the local area, as reflected, for example, by the crime rate. Pattavina et al. (2006) 
make a similar observation in explaining their finding that participation in community 
crime prevention was not highest in the wealthiest, lowest crime rate areas. Instead, the 
factors affecting citizen participation in crime prevention varied by neighbourhood crime 
risk levels. In high-crime neighbourhoods, residents who felt like part of the neighbour-
hood, minority residents and residents who believed that the police get to know residents 
were more likely to participate. In low- to moderate-risk neighbourhoods, a more complex 
web of predictors fuelled participation, with additional differences based on home owner-
ship and previous victimization (Pattavina et al. 2006: 228).
It is often assumed that citizens’ beliefs about the police are related to their willing-
ness to engage in anti-crime measures at the neighbourhood level (Frank et al. 1996). 
Studies have suggested that participation in anti-crime initiatives, including NW, is 
facilitated where residents have favourable opinions towards the police and believe that 
the police do a good job (Shernock 1986; Bennett 1989; Yarwood and Edwards 1995). 
However, other studies find no evidence of differential participation once other factors 
were controlled for (e.g. Frank et al. 1996). Bennett (1989) found that participants in 
NW were more likely than non-participants to view the police as helpful, believed that 
the police were doing a good job, and were pleased with police performance. But par-
ticipation was not associated with knowing a police officer by name, feeling the police 
understood the problems of residents living in their area or among those who had made 
proactive contact with the police over the last year. This suggests that the nature of the 
relationship with the police may be playing a role in shaping participation. Indeed, 
Reisig (2007) found that citizens who judged police practices to be fair and respectful 
were more willing to participate in community crime prevention initiatives. This find-
ing held across areas with low, moderate and high levels of property crime. Pattavina 
et al. (2006) also found that participation in crime prevention activities was less to do 
with perceptions of the effectiveness of the police and more to do with the development 
of personal relationships between the police and residents in these areas.
North American research tends to find that participation in organized anti-crime 
initiatives can be understood as an extension of ‘civic mindedness’ and wider participa-
tion in community organizations (Rosenbaum 1988; Skogan 1988; Bennett 1989, and 
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see studies by DuBow and Podolefsky 1982; Lavrakas and Herz 1982; Shernock 1986). 
Bennett (1989) also found participants in NW were more involved in their community 
than non-participants, leading him to conclude that participation might be a function 
of both crime and wider community participation. So while the salience of crime pro-
vides the external, environmental impetus for the development of community crime 
prevention programs, this may be more a necessary rather than a sufficient condition 
for their origin (Lavrakas and Herz 1982).
The degree of social cohesion—measured by factors such as whether citizens have 
confidence in the ability of others to combat crime, felt they were friends with their 
neighbours and reported territorial attitudes or supportive environments—has also 
been linked with participation in NW (Lavrakas and Herz 1982; Hope 1988; Frank 
et al. 1996). Skogan (1989) found a tendency for less cohesive communities to employ 
more formal responses to crime, in part because in these areas informal capacity to 
problem-solve and organize against crime was weak. Others have reported mixed 
evidence. Bennett (1989), for example, reported significant differences in one of his 
research sites but not in the other. In addition, Pattavina et al. (2006) revealed a link 
between one indicator of social cohesion (residents feel like they are part of the neigh-
bourhood) and participation but not another (rely on neighbours for help).
While studies that have examined the relationship between ‘attachment’ to the 
community and participation in NW reveal mixed findings, it has often been shown 
that members of NW have a ‘stake in the community’ (Shernock 1986; Frank et  al. 
1996; Pattavina et al. 2006). Especially important has been long-term residency in an 
area, home ownership and housing type—with those living in flats often less likely to 
participate (Lavrakas and Herz 1982; Henig 1984; Hope 1988; Husain 1988; Bennett 
1989; Webb 1994; Frank et al. 1996). This has generally been explained by the belief 
that homeowners have greater commitment to maintaining standards within an area 
because of incentives to maintain house prices and their greater freedom and respon-
sibility for taking prevention measures (Hope 1995: 45).
There are also socio-demographic differences in participation in NW. But while most 
research points to NW members being older (Shernock 1986; Webb 1994; Yarwood 
and Edwards 1995), even this is not universally agreed. For example, Lavrakas and 
Herz (1982) find participants tended to be aged less than 50 years, and Bennett (1989) 
reported no differences in participation on the basis of age. The evidence regarding 
the role played by ethnicity and gender is also mixed. Reviews of US-based studies 
have suggested that Black residents are more likely to participate (e.g. Bennett 1989), 
while other studies demonstrate that NW members are more commonly White (Henig 
1984; Shernock 1986; Webb 1994; Pattavina et al. 2006) and some find no differences 
between ethnic groups. Similarly, while some studies have shown that NW members are 
more likely to be men (Hope 1988; Husain 1988; Yarwood and Edwards 1995), others 
have found participants are more likely to be women (Webb 1994).
Data
To assess the changing levels of NW in England and Wales and explore the key house-
hold and neighbourhood factors that remain important for participation in the 
co-production of NW, we use data from the CSEW. This is a nationally representative 
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survey of residents’ experiences of crime and victimization. It has fielded questions 
about NW to a random subsample of respondents since 1988, allowing us to provide 
an overall picture of the changing prevalence of NW over the last three decades. The 
questions were omitted from the survey in 1998, 2002/03–2003/04 and 2007/08–
2008/09, which limits our ability to provide a complete time trend. The survey has 
consistently maintained a response rate of more than 70%, achieving a response of 
75% in 2010–11 (ONS 2012).
Long-term trends in Neighbourhood Watch proliferation in England and Wales
Changing levels of NW proliferation since 1988 are examined using annual weighted 
estimates of three survey items:
1. Is there a Neighbourhood Watch Scheme currently operating in this area that covers 
your address? Yes, No, Don’t know2
2. Is your household currently a member of the scheme? Yes, No, Don’t know
3. Would your household join a scheme if there were one in this area? Yes, No, Don’t know
For each survey year, the percentage of households reporting that the area is part of an 
NW scheme, levels of household participation (overall, and restricted to areas where a 
scheme was in operation) and the percentage of residents reporting that they would 
like to belong to an NW scheme if it were available, are collated. We then use time-series 
cross-sectional models (Gelman and Hill 2007), with observations grouped in survey 
year, to examine whether overall trends in the prevalence of NW are consistent across 
household groups. Comparatively, few measures in the CSEW have been included in a 
consistent way across all survey waves, so we restrict our focus to differences based on 
accommodation type (detached, semi-detached, terraced, flats or other), household 
income, housing tenure (owner occupied, private rented, social rented) and reported 
levels of safety at home at night. We also include controls for respondent gender, age 
and length of residence in the local area. All household characteristics are interacted 
with survey year to enable assessment of whether observed differences in levels of par-
ticipation have changed over time. Models also include a quadratic function of year to 
account for potential non-linearities.
Results
Throughout the 1990s, there was a general increase in the number of NW schemes in 
operation in England and Wales, with more than 30% of areas identified as part of a 
scheme by 2000, up from less than 20% of areas in 1988 (Figure 1, top panel). The num-
ber of areas operating NW then remained stable throughout the 2000s and no visible 
increase following the 2008 financial crisis.3 However, while the number of areas with 
a scheme appears to have remained comparatively stable, the number of households 
2Despite asking about the presence of an NW scheme in ‘this area’, respondents were not required to make reference to a 
specific geographical boundary when answering. Respondents may therefore be reporting on different spatial geographies, 
leading to response variation within each area. As a result, this is treated as a household-level measure in the analysis.
3The apparent fall in 2004–05 is likely to reflect a change in question wording. Prior to 2004–05, the survey asked whether an 
NW scheme had ever been in operation in the area. In 2004–05, this was changed to ‘in the last year’.
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opting to be part of a scheme has fallen steadily (Figure 1, middle panel). Approximately 
40% of households in eligible areas were part of NW by 2010–11, down from more than 
80% in 1988. The main reason for not being a part of a scheme (reported by more than 
one quarter of respondents) was that they had not been asked to join. Other frequently 
noted reasons were being too busy, or not yet getting round to it, and not knowing how to 
join or having insufficient information about it. Only 6% said they were not interested, 
and just 1% did not think they were effective (for full results, see Appendix Table A1). 
The comparatively low levels of participation do not, however, appear to be reflect-
ive of a lack of demand, with the number of people indicating that they would join a 
scheme if one was available remaining relatively stable and more than 70% since 1988 
(Figure 1, bottom panel). Of course, the high number of people indicating that they 
would like to join a scheme may in part be reflective of a social desirability bias, with 
respondents using this item to offset their existing lack of involvement (Nunnally 1978).
Table 1 includes results from the repeated cross-sectional models, confirming the 
initial growth of NW and subsequent declines. Residents of semi-detached properties, 
terraces and flats are less likely to report being in an NW area than those living in 
Fig. 1 Trends in participation in Neighbourhood Watch (NW). Respondent reports that area is 
part of an NW scheme (top panel); household a member of NW (middle panel); would join an NW 
scheme if one was available (bottom panel)
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detached accommodation (Model 1). Wealthier households, owner-occupiers and long-
term residents are also more likely to report being in an NW area. These differences 
are generally stable over time, although there is moderate evidence that the income 
gap has reduced, and there has also been a small increase in reported NW prevalence 
among those living in social housing. A similar picture is evident when household mem-
bership of NW is considered (Model 2), although there is evidence of further declines 
in membership among semi-detached and terraced accommodation. Finally, we note 
lower odds of future NW enrolment among resident living in flats, those living in ren-
tal accommodation and those who report feeling safe at home after dark (Model 3). 
Conversely, women are more likely to indicate they would join a scheme, as are those 
with higher levels of income.
Table 1  Multilevel repeated cross-sectional analysis of changing participation in Neighbourhood Watch 
(1988–2010/11)
Model 1: NW in 
area
Model 2: House  
part of NW
Model 3: Would  
join NW
OR SE OR SE OR SE
Year 1.11** 0.03 1.08** 0.02 1.00 0.02
Year2 0.995** 0.00 0.996** 0.00 1.00 0.00
Accommodation (ref.: detached)
Semi-detached 0.81** 0.05 0.79** 0.05 0.92 0.08
Terraced 0.57** 0.04 0.51** 0.04 0.89 0.08
Flat 0.46** 0.04 0.33** 0.04 0.72** 0.07
Other 0.79 0.11 0.60** 0.10 0.77** 0.12
Semi-detached × year 0.99 0.00 0.98** 0.00 0.99 0.01
Terraced × year 1.00 0.00 0.99* 0.01 0.99* 0.01
Flat × year 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.01 0.98* 0.01
Other × year 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.98 0.01
Income (ref.: under £20,000)
£20,000+ 1.53** 0.08 1.65** 0.09 1.41** 0.10
£20,000+ × year 0.99** 0.00 0.98** 0.00 0.99 0.00
Tenure (ref.: owner)
Private rented 0.73** 0.07 0.76* 0.09 0.50** 0.05
Social rented 0.55** 0.03 0.51** 0.04 0.63** 0.04
Private rented × year 1.01 0.01 0.99 0.01 1.01 0.01
Social rented × year 1.03** 0.00 1.01* 0.01 0.99 0.01
Feel very safe at home 0.95 0.04 1.02 0.05 0.84** 0.05
Feel very safe at home × year 1.01* 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Female 1.03 0.02 1.09** 0.03 1.21** 0.03
Age (centred) 1.01** 0.00 1.02** 0.00 0.998** 0.00
Years in area 1.04** 0.01 1.15** 0.01 0.94** 0.01
Constant 0.39 0.06 0.16 0.02 5.96 0.85
Random effects
Year 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Years/individuals 11/46,177 11/50,056 11/32,283
NW, Neighbourhood Watch; OR, odds ratio.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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Explaining membership in Neighbourhood Watch
To provide a more detailed assessment of the household and neighbourhood charac-
teristics that remain influential for participation in NW, we estimate multilevel logistic 
regression models (Goldstein 2011) for each of our three measures of NW participation 
in 2010–11.
Household characteristics
To account for differences in involvement in NW between households, we include details 
of the household reference person’s gender, age, ethnicity and socio-economic status. 
We also record the number of children in the household, how long they have been 
resident in the area and whether it is a multiple adult household. Details of the type of 
accommodation, housing tenure, whether there is a visible burglar alarm, whether the 
house is left unoccupied during the day and whether the house is surrounded by vis-
ible signs of disorder4 are also included. Finally, we also identify those respondents who 
reported being a victim of crime in the previous 12 months, whether they report worry-
ing about crime in general and whether they believe the local police do a good job (all 
binary coded).5 Full descriptive details are included in Appendix Table A2.
Area characteristics
To examine differences in NW participation between different local communities, 
we link the household-level data from the CSEW to Middle layer Super Output Areas 
(MSOA)—a census geography with each area comprising approximately 2,000 house-
holds that were grouped together based on similarity of tenure and accommodation 
type. Respondents are clustered in a total of 2,230 MSOA. For each area, we include a 
number of area measures derived using data from the 2001 census.6 A total of 21 dif-
ferent census variables were combined using a factorial ecology approach (Rees 1971) 
to produce five distinct indices measuring differences between each area (full factor 
loadings in Appendix Table A3). These cover:
• Concentrated disadvantage—with more disadvantaged areas typically having higher 
numbers of single-parent families, households on income support and unemployed 
people, but fewer residents identified as in managerial and professional occupations, 
and with fewer owner-occupiers.
• Urbanicity—higher scores characterize areas with higher population density and 
more domestic properties, but relatively little green space.
• Population mobility—areas score higher if there are higher levels of in- and out-migra-
tion, as well as more single-person households.
4To measure signs of disorder, we used factor analysis to combine the scores from three interviewer ratings of the immediate 
area around each household covering (factor scores in parentheses): levels of litter/rubbish (0.78), vandalism/graffiti (0.83) 
and housing condition (0.84).
5The CSEW selects one individual from each household to complete the survey; therefore, it is not possible to further unpick 
the relative influence of households and individuals. We therefore assume that these individual measures provide a reasonable 
approximation for the shared views and experiences of the household.
6Boundary changes precluded us from incorporating data from the 2011 census.
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• Age profile—higher scores associated with areas that have a younger population.
• Housing structure—higher scores for areas with more terraced and vacant properties, 
but fewer flats.
We also include a general measure of the level of crime in each area, calculated as 
the population weighted average score for the crime component of the 2010 Index of 
Deprivation. This is the most temporally proximate year of the Index of Deprivation 
that precedes our survey data, and is based on police recorded crime in 2008. In add-
ition to main effects for all neighbourhood characteristics, we also include the inter-
action between the neighbourhood level of concentrated disadvantage and the crime 
rate to see whether objective crime risks moderate the link from deprivation to partici-
pation in NW (Skogan 1989; Pattavina et al. 2006).
Results
By 2010–11, NW was operating in one third of areas in England and Wales, although 
only 40% of households in those areas were active members of the scheme. Table 1 
includes results from three multilevel models examining in more detail which areas 
and households were most likely to be part of NW.7 Consistent with expectations, we 
find that NW is significantly less likely to be in operation in areas where there are greater 
levels of concentrated disadvantage, with the odds of a scheme being in operation 
approximately 24% lower for every 1 SD increase in the level of disadvantage (Model 
4). NW schemes are also significantly less likely to be found in more urban areas (with 
an estimated odds ratio of 0.85) and areas with a younger age profile (0.91). We also 
find NW is less likely in areas that are characterized by more terraced accommodation 
and vacant properties (0.87). These areas also tend to have slightly lower than average 
numbers of flats, suggesting a more complex picture of the role that housing structure 
may play in the presence of NW schemes (Table 2).
Areas with a higher crime rate are significantly more likely to be part of NW, although 
this effect is dependent on the level of neighbourhood disadvantage. Figure 2 demon-
strates this moderating effect for a ‘typical’ area (when all other individual and neigh-
bourhood characteristics are held at their mean). In areas where there is a low level of 
neighbourhood disadvantage (bottom 25% of the distribution), the probability of an 
NW scheme being in operation is comparatively high and is not influenced by the sur-
rounding levels of crime. Conversely, in areas with higher levels of disadvantage (top 
25% of the distribution), NW is less likely to be in operation and is more closely depend-
ent on the levels of crime. So disadvantaged areas with a higher level of crime are more 
likely to operate an NW scheme than similar areas with a low level of crime, but both 
are less likely to have a scheme in operation than areas with a low level of disadvantage. 
Additional sensitivity checks restricting the analysis to the most disadvantaged neigh-
bourhoods confirmed this non-linear relationship with crime, but that all other effects 
operated as shown in the main models. Significant differences between neighbour-
hoods are still evident when these area characteristics have been accounted for, with a 
residual neighbourhood variance of 0.52.
7Figure 1 also demonstrated that 15% of people did not know if a scheme was in operation in the area. People were more likely 
to be uncertain about the existence of NW if they had recently arrived in the area, had not been a victim of crime, did not own 
their home and lived in a more urban area (see Appendix Table A4).
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Differences are also evident between particular types of households. Households that 
hold more positive views of the local police have almost 50% higher odds of living in 
NW areas. Social housing and households that have a visible burglar alarm are also 
Table 2  Multilevel logistic regression models examining participation in Neighbourhood Watch (2010–11)
Model 4: NW  
in area 
(excluding DK)
Model 5: House 
part of NW
Model 6: Would 
join NW
OR SE OR SE OR SE
Household characteristics
Female (HRPa) 0.92 0.08 1.11 0.17 1.14 0.12
Age (HRPa) 1.00 0.00 1.03** 0.01 1.00 0.00
Number of children in HH 0.91* 0.04 0.96 0.09 1.01 0.06
Years in area 1.02 0.03 1.15** 0.05 0.98 0.03
Cohabiting HH 1.03 0.09 1.24 0.19 1.51** 0.17
Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (HRPa) 1.11 0.17 0.89 0.28 1.51* 0.31
Accommodation (ref.: detached)
Semi-detached 0.86 0.09 0.43** 0.08 1.05 0.15
Terraced 0.82 0.10 0.41** 0.09 0.83 0.13
Flat/other 0.90 0.14 0.51* 0.14 0.63* 0.12
Socio-economic status (ref.: managerial/professional)
Intermediate occupations 1.26 0.17 0.74 0.18 1.05 0.19
Small employers and own account workers 0.91 0.11 0.75 0.16 0.81 0.13
Lower supervisory and technical occupations 1.06 0.13 0.87 0.19 0.92 0.15
Semi-routine and routine occupations 1.03 0.10 0.69* 0.13 0.97 0.12
Never worked and long-term unemployed 1.14 0.26 0.98 0.41 0.60 0.16
Tenure (ref.: owner-occupier)
Social rented sector 1.28* 0.15 0.86 0.19 0.59** 0.08
Private rented sector 0.84 0.10 0.51** 0.13 0.69** 0.10
Victim of crime 0.93 0.08 1.31 0.22 1.00 0.11
Worried about crime overall 1.03 0.08 1.12 0.16 1.70** 0.18
Local police do a good job 1.45** 0.11 1.29 0.18 1.25* 0.12
Has a visible burglar alarm 1.20* 0.10 1.18 0.18 1.12 0.13
Home unoccupied during week 0.99 0.12 1.22 0.28 1.20 0.19
Household disorder 0.83** 0.04 0.81* 0.08 0.90* 0.05
Area characteristics
Concentrated disadvantage 0.76** 0.05 0.72** 0.09 0.95 0.07
Crime rate 1.29** 0.12 1.45* 0.25 0.91 0.10
Crime rate × disadvantage 1.14* 0.07 1.22 0.14 1.15 0.09
Urbanicity 0.85** 0.04 0.96 0.09 1.05 0.07
Population mobility 0.98 0.05 0.91 0.08 1.02 0.06
Age profile 0.91* 0.04 0.96 0.07 0.99 0.05
Housing structure 0.86** 0.04 0.99 0.09 0.96 0.05
Constant 0.41 0.09 0.37 0.15 2.32 0.65
Random effects
Area 0.52 0.12 0.81 0.41 0.32 0.18
Approximate ICC 0.14 0.20 0.09
Areas/individuals 2,230/4,237 1,126/1,550 1,874/2,999
DK, don't knows; HH, household; HRP, Household Reference Person; ICC, intraclass correlation;  
NW, Neighbourhood Watch; OR, odds ratio.
aUses respondent in Model 3 because asking for individual opinion. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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Fig. 2 Predicted probability that area is part of a Neighbourhood Watch scheme. Predicted 
probabilities are calculated for the ‘typical’ area, with all other variables held at their mean value
more likely to be in NW areas. In contrast, households surrounded by more signs of 
low-level disorder are significantly less likely to be in NW areas (0.83), as are households 
containing more children (0.91).
Restricting the focus to those areas where a scheme is known to be operating (Model 
5), households are more likely to belong to NW if they have been resident in the area for 
longer and when the head of the household is older. People living in terraced housing, 
semi-detached accommodation and flats are less likely to participate, as are those who 
rent their property. People living in houses surrounded by greater levels of disorder are 
also significantly less likely to participate. The included area characteristics are gener-
ally not influential in determining whether particular households opt to be part of an 
NW scheme, although we do find that houses in more disadvantaged areas are less likely 
to participate while those in high-crime areas are more likely to be involved. Significant 
differences between neighbourhoods remain, with a residual neighbourhood variance 
of 0.81 suggesting that other features of the local neighbourhood may be influential in 
determining whether particular households choose to opt into an NW scheme.
Despite the steady fall in the proportion of households opting to be part of NW 
since 1988, the levels of interest from non-member households have remained rela-
tively stable. Model 6 shows that Black, Asian and Other Minority ethnic households 
have approximately 50% higher odds of indicating that they would be willing to join a 
scheme. People who worry about crime and those who have more favourable attitudes 
towards the police are also more likely to want to be part of NW. In contrast, those liv-
ing in flats, as well as those in rented accommodation, have significantly lower odds of 
wanting to participate. We also find that people living in houses that are surrounded by 
more visible signs of disorder are also less likely to want to be part of NW. However, we 
find no systematic differences between areas.
Conclusion
This article has examined patterns of participation in NW in England and Wales since 
its inception in the early 1980s to the end of the New Labour era (2010–11). This issue 
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is an important one since the co-production of services has been a major theme within 
the narratives of successive governments in England and Wales, as elsewhere. The influ-
ence of co-production is also contested contest as it is based on an assumption that citi-
zens will work with service providers to construct public goods (Mattson 1986; Pestoff 
2009). We add to the theoretical and empirical debates regarding who ‘produces’ crime 
control in two key ways.
First, we add to the body of literature that suggests that it should not be assumed 
that citizens will co-produce (Osborne and Strokosch 2013). We find only moderate 
uptake of NW in England and Wales and a general decline in individual membership. 
While the number of areas with NW in England and Wales rose quickly following their 
initial inception in the early 1980s, they have remained stable, at about 30%, since the 
early 2000s. And at the same time, household membership has been falling—from 80% 
in 1988 to about 40% by 2010–11. As a result, only one-in-ten households in England 
and Wales was part of NW by this time. NW rose to prominence at the height of the 
neo-liberal governments of the 1980s–1990s. But declined during or shortly after New 
Labour politics came to the fore. The reasons for this cannot be revealed by the present 
analysis. However, our findings undermine any assumption that citizens are routinely 
prepared to accept the burden of crime control that current political discourses pro-
mote and economic necessity may demand. They also question the long-term viability 
of approaches to crime control which seek to co-opt the initiative of citizens (see also 
Mukherjee and Wilson 1987; Rosenbaum 1988).
Second, we add to the body of literature regarding who co-produces, and in par-
ticular the vexed question of whether NW has regressive effects (Rosenbaum 1987; 
Skogan 1988; Laycock and Tilley 1995; Hope 2000; Bullock 2014). NW has often been 
associated with wealthier, long-term residents who own their own homes and so have 
attachments to the security of place and property (e.g. Lavrakas and Herz 1982; Henig 
1984; Shernock 1986; Hope 1988; McConville and Shepherd 1992; Frank et al. 1996; 
Pattavina et al. 2006). We make similar observations though we report a small increase 
in reported NW membership among those in social housing. Indeed, consistent with 
expectations, we found that NW is significantly less likely to be in operation in areas 
where there are greater levels of concentrated disadvantage. However, we have also 
demonstrated that crime rates moderate the effect of disadvantage. And that disadvan-
taged areas with a higher level of crime are more likely to operate an NW scheme than 
similar areas with a low level of crime. There are several possible explanations for this.
First, in areas of relative affluence, the costs of establishing and maintaining NW, 
which may not ask much of its members, may be low. Hence, they can be established 
even where crime risks are low and action again crime not a necessity. The situation 
is different in less affluent areas. In these cases, there are hurdles—such as fewer 
opportunities to volunteer, lower levels of trust between citizens and between citizens 
and public officials—that may need to be overcome to seed and sustain activity are 
more extensive. As such, reflecting studies that suggest that propensity to co-produce 
is related to the salience of a social problem (Loeffler and Bovaird 2016; Van Eijk and 
Steen 2016) efforts may be warranted only where the crime risk is particularly elevated 
(see also Skogan 1989). Second, it is plausible that practitioners exert greater efforts 
to establish NW in disadvantaged areas with higher crime risk (Gresham et al. 2004). 
However, research has failed to demonstrate that increased efforts by practitioners 
in areas of disadvantage lead to the establishment of more NWs (Rosenbaum 1987). 
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Third, our observations may reflect variation in the characteristics of those individu-
als who live in high-risk areas, for example better-off individuals in high-risk areas may 
be driving participation. To assess this possibility, we conducted additional analyses 
looking specifically at the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods (available on request). 
However, this did not reveal further area or household influences on the proliferation 
of NW.
Whatever the explanation, our finding that citizens will respond where objective 
risks are high in areas where conditions are unfavourable is an important one. It has 
implications for how we think about the concept of co-production and more specifically 
how we think about citizen participation in crime control at the local level. Our obser-
vations call into question the oft-held view that neighbourhood disadvantage under-
mines co-production. Suggesting instead that citizens will co-produce in unfavourable 
circumstances—but the conditions have to be right.
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Appendix
Table A1  Reasons for not joining Neighbourhood Watch (2012–13)
Frequency %
No one has asked us to join 425 27
No particular reason 383 24
Too busy/not enough time 213 14
Haven’t got around to it yet/never thought about it 193 12
Another reason 162 10
Don’t know how to join 143 9
Don’t know enough about the scheme 119 8
Not interested 95 6
Not much crime in the local area 70 4
Don’t think they are effective 21 1
Don’t know 5 0
Sample size 1,564
Table A2  Descriptive statistics
Mean SD
Dependent variables
Neighbourhood Watch area 0.35 0.48
House in Neighbourhood Watch 0.43 0.50
Would join Neighbourhood Watch 0.75 0.44
Household characteristics
Female (HRP) 0.40 0.49
Age (HRP) 0.21 17.25
Number of children in HH 0.46 0.88
Years in area 4.54 1.79
Cohabiting HH 0.50 0.50
Non-white (HRP) 0.08 0.27
Accommodation type (ref.: detached)
Semi-detached 0.32 0.47
Terraced 0.27 0.45
Flat/other 0.14 0.34
Socio-economic status of HRP (ref.: managerial/professional)
Intermediate occupations 0.09 0.29
Small employers and own account workers 0.11 0.32
Lower supervisory and technical occupations 0.12 0.32
Semi-routine and routine occupations 0.27 0.44
Never worked and long-term unemployed 0.03 0.17
Tenure (ref.: owner-occupier)
Social rented sector 0.17 0.37
Private rented sector 0.16 0.37
Victim of crime 0.23 0.42
Worried about crime overall 0.30 0.46
Local police do a good job 0.59 0.49
Has a visible burglar alarm 0.26 0.44
Home unoccupied during week 0.90 0.30
Household disorder 0.00 0.91
Area characteristics
Concentrated disadvantage −0.04 0.96
Urbanicity −0.17 0.98
Population mobility −0.03 0.92
Age profile −0.04 1.03
Housing structure 0.04 0.90
Crime rate −0.09 0.71
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Table A3  Rotated component loadings from factorial ecology
Neighbourhood measure Concentrated 
disadvantage
Urbanicity Population 
mobility
Age 
profile
Housing 
profile
Working population on income support 0.89 0.25 0.19 0.14 0.09
Lone parent families 0.85 0.22 0.00 0.26 0.15
Local authority housing 0.85 0.06 −0.01 0.15 −0.17
Working population unemployed 0.84 0.29 0.17 0.12 0.13
Non-car owning households 0.80 0.42 0.36 −0.01 0.06
Working in professional/managerial role −0.79 0.00 0.15 0.15 −0.37
Owner occupied housing −0.61 −0.25 −0.35 −0.57 0.05
Domestic property 0.10 0.92 0.17 0.05 0.11
Green space −0.21 −0.90 −0.18 −0.01 −0.04
Population density (per km2) 0.25 0.82 0.26 0.15 −0.14
Working in agriculture −0.13 −0.66 −0.01 −0.18 −0.03
In-migration −0.07 0.10 0.92 0.07 0.07
Out-migration −0.02 0.16 0.90 0.12 0.13
Single-person, non-pensioner households 0.36 0.36 0.74 0.13 −0.09
Commercial property 0.38 0.43 0.53 0.02 −0.09
More than 1.5 people per room 0.43 0.47 0.51 0.20 −0.33
Resident population over 65 −0.05 −0.21 −0.27 −0.89 −0.02
Resident population under 16 0.43 0.04 −0.46 0.64 0.19
Terraced housing 0.32 0.26 0.10 0.27 0.69
Vacant property 0.32 −0.12 0.49 −0.17 0.53
Flats 0.45 0.36 0.49 0.01 −0.52
Eigen value 9.3 3.3 1.9 1.4 1.3
Table A4  Do not know whether area is part of Neighbourhood Watch
Odds ratio SE
Household characteristics
Female (HRP) 1.01 0.10
Age (HRP) 0.98** 0.00
Number of children in HH 0.92 0.05
Years in area 0.82** 0.02
Cohabiting HH 0.92 0.10
Non-white (HRP) 1.38* 0.22
Accommodation type (ref.: detached)
Semi-detached 1.12 0.15
Terraced 1.15 0.17
Flat/other 1.09 0.20
Socio-economic status of HRP (ref: Managerial/professional)
Intermediate occupations 0.89 0.15
Small employers and own account workers 0.90 0.15
Lower supervisory and technical occupations 1.11 0.17
Semi-routine and routine occupations 1.34* 0.16
Never worked and long-term unemployed 0.93 0.25
Tenure (ref.: owner-occupier)
Social rented sector 1.28 0.18
Private rented sector 1.60** 0.20
Victim of crime 0.83 0.09
Worried about crime overall 0.89 0.09
Local police do a good job 0.89 0.08
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Odds ratio SE
Has a visible burglar alarm 1.00 0.11
Home unoccupied during week 0.86 0.13
Household disorder 1.05 0.06
Area characteristics
Concentrated disadvantage 1.08 0.08
Crime rate 0.93 0.10
Crime rate × disadvantage 1.02 0.07
Urbanicity 1.08 0.06
Population mobility 1.05 0.06
Age profile 1.04 0.05
Housing structure 0.90* 0.05
Constant 0.34 0.09
Random effects
Area 0.39 0.18
Approximate ICC 0.11
Areas/individuals 2,430/4,958
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
Table A4  Continued
BRUNTON-SMITH AND BULLOCK
Page 22 of 22
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/bjc/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/bjc/azy012/4999983 by U
niversity of Surrey user on 26 O
ctober 2018
